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Abstract
A safe, secure, and functional information network is vital in today’s Air Force
net centric environment. Information is more critical today than it has ever been. As
more operational functions are placed in cyber space and greater computing power
becomes available to everyone, keeping these networks safe and secure is an almost
unattainable task. Network security entails Intrusion Detection Security, but another
form of security or “insecurity” is quickly gaining attention. Honeypots allow the black
hat community to attack and penetrate non-production systems. By monitoring and
studying these attacks, network defenders can develop better Information Assurance
tactics, techniques and procedures to defend their networks.
The ability to quickly analyze only those data packets predicted to be an exploit
and disregard the remaining packets is crucial in today’s overworked environment.
Using an accredited honeypot, an Exploit Prediction System (EPS) is developed using a
decision-tree matrix. The EPS provides an excellent tool in choosing only those data
packets needing further analysis. The EPS uses as few criteria as possible for successful
prediction. The log data from the honeypot is not filtered and all incoming log data is
captured, interpreted and categorized.

xi

EARLY WARNING AND PREDICTION OF INTERNET ATTACKS AND EXPLOITS
1. Introduction and Importance of Research Topic
A safe, secure and functional information network is vital in today’s Air Force net
centric environment. Information is more critical today than it has ever been. As more
operational functions are placed in cyber space and greater computing power becomes
available to everyone, keeping these networks safe and secure is an almost unattainable
task. Network security entails Intrusion Detection security, but another form of security
or “insecurity” is quickly gaining attention. The black hat or computer hacker
community thrives on attacking and capturing systems for the sheer pleasure of it.
Allowing these criminals to penetrate and capture a non-production system gives network
administrators valuable information and insight on not only the next exploit about to
attack their networks but also how the hackers penetrate and capture systems. These nonproduction systems are called honeypots and network administrators should seriously
consider adding them to their Information Assurance (IA) arsenal.
1.1 Background
Network defense is the only career field in the Air Force that sees combat every
single day [Bus05]. However, much of the information network defenders see is
irrelevant or needs no further analysis. By narrowing the focus and time spent on log
data, network defenders can more effectively scrutinize only those packets or bytes of
information that may cause harm to their network. Oftentimes, the same person
defending the network is also performing other non-IA tasks.
1

1.2 The Research Goals
The goal of this research is simple. Using an accredited honeypot, develop an
Exploit Prediction System (EPS) that predicts when an exploit has been sent to the
honeypot. The EPS uses a decision tree matrix with as few criteria as possible for
successful prediction. The log data coming into the honeypot is not filtered and all data
is captured, interpreted, and categorized.
1.3 Approach
Using an accredited honeypot and a training period, train the EPS decision matrix
to recognize exploits launched against the honeypot. With the EPS, successfully predict
exploits during the analysis and results stage of this research. After the research phase,
determine if enough data has been collected and if the EPS proved successful. False
negatives and false positives are also identified.
1.4 Summary
Information assurance is information operations that protect and defend
information and information systems. Their availability, integrity, authentication,
confidentiality and non-repudiation are ensured by preventing malicious logic or
computer software code to be loaded onto the network. Studying and monitoring hackers
on a non-production system provides valuable insight on how malicious logic or
computer software code is loaded onto the production system. The rest of this document
is organized as follows. Chapter 2 contains the literature review and provides
background on honeypots and their uses. Chapter 3 describes the research methodology
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used to achieve the goals of this research. Chapter 4 details the experimental results and
the screenshots of detected exploits. Finally, Chapter 5 describes conclusions drawn
from this research and also identifies future areas of research.

3

2. Background and Literature Search
Honeypots are closely monitored and secured network decoys serving several
purposes: they can distract adversaries from production machines on a network; they can
provide early warning about new attack and exploitation trends; and they allow in-depth
examination of adversaries during and after exploitation of a honeypot. In short,
honeypots are a highly flexible security tool with numerous applications for security
[Spi03a].
Honeypots, however, will not secure a network. Instead they are intended to
facilitate prevention, detection or information gathering. Honeypots all share the same
purpose; they are a security resource that has no production value. In other words,
deployment of honeypots in a network should not adversely affect the performance of
critical network services and applications.
System administrators typically defend their networks with reactive tools.
Honeypots are a proactive tool. Using a honeypot, network administrators can detect and
study harmful activities on a network and harden operational systems from similar
attacks. Since honeypots only carry “honey” (what the attackers want to access) and
have no real or operational data, any activity on the system is suspicious. Therefore,
system logs can be analyzed for harmful activity more efficiently than logs with
operational data.
Defensive tools for network administrators include software patches, boundary
router protections, intrusion detections systems and internal system controls. Used
together, these tools provide a sound defensive plan against potential attacks. However,
as the blackhat community increases their skills, network administrators need to become
4

proactive. An example of a proactive approach is contained in “The Cuckoo’s Egg”
[Sto89] and “An Evening With Berferd” [Che01].
In “The Cuckoo’s Egg”, Cliff Stoll, an astronomer working as a systems
administrator in 1989 for Berkeley Labs, noticed a 75-cent accounting error on his
monthly audits. Upon further investigation and with very little help from government
agencies, Stoll determined a hacker was entering his network from a communist country
hunting for military documents and secrets (the “honey”). After nearly one-year of
investigation and numerous nights of monitoring the hacker, Stoll was able to alert the
KBG and finally convince United States government agencies that a spy ring dealing in
large amounts of cash and cocaine had invaded his computer network.
“An Evening With Berferd” describes Bill Cheswick’s of AT&T Laboratories
adventures when a hacker entered their network via the infamous sendmail DEBUG hole
in AT&T’s Internet gateway machine in January 1991. Cheswick wanted the hacker to
enter their system so AT&T could log his sessions and learn from his exploits. Due to
close monitoring, any potential targets were warned in advance. Fake services (the
“honey”) were added to better entice the hacker. The paper chronicles the successes and
failures of the hacker who was mostly interested in military targets and new machines.
After about four months, the hacker was disconnected from the network. The greatest
lesson learned in this case was if a hacker can log onto your system, they would acquire
root access in a very short period.
Although the word “honeypot” was not used, these two readings capture the
essence of honeypots. Any research endeavor into honeypots should begin by reading
these books.
5

The genesis of organized honeypot research was the Honeynet Project. The
Honeynet Project [Hon00a – Hon 04b] is a non-profit research organization of security
professionals dedicated to information security. Their website provides an excellent email list distributing their latest findings. The book, “Honeypots: Tracking Hackers” is
an exhaustive survey into the world of honeypots operation and research [Spi03a].
2.1 Why Hackers Hack
A short time ago, the term hacker was a positive name bestowed upon people who
could actually make computers work and produce the output desired. Today’s definition
is very different. A hacker (or attacker) is someone who wants control of your network.
The motives of attackers can be surmised in the acronym MEECES: Money, Ego,
Entertainment, Cause (basic ideology), Entrance to a social group and Status [Spi03b].
The various ways hackers attempt to compromise computer systems include:
Denial of Service (DOS): This attack floods the intended target (Website, IP
address or network) with large amounts of hits or attempted accesses and effectively
renders the website useless due to inability to transmit or receive data. Attackers first
compromise hundreds or thousands of systems to fully engage this attack. The attacker
uses these “owned” systems to deny service to their target. The DOS will render a
Website useless; the same effect as if it were hacked and compromised. Often, many
blackhats use DOS to take out other blackhats. Many hackers claim they make money by
“packeting”, slang for DOS attack.
BOTS (automated robots): BOTS act on the blackhat’s behalf in a
preprogrammed fashion. This allows blackhats to capture as many systems as possible

6

with much less effort. BOTS or automated tools are the greatest risk to the security
community [Spi03a].
Credit Cards: Captured systems are used as currency in the blackhat
community. Blackhats will trade captured systems for stolen credit card numbers
[Hon00a].
Bragging rights: To elevate status among the blackhat community, hackers must
prove their skills. The more sites captured, the higher status attained. Often hackers
attack a website, change it and then secure that site to demonstrate their skill.
CPU Cycles: Worms will consume the CPU of affected machines. Consumed
CPUs spend all processing power working for the attacker, making the machine useless
for the intended user. The more CPU cycles gained, the greater the bragging rights and
higher status.
Corporate Espionage: Business organizations may try to attack competitor
systems to gain an edge in the business environment. These may be a simple DOS attack
to deny the competitor’s consumers access to the website. It may entail outright
downloading of proprietary information. Usually, these are advanced blackhats as most
of the systems attempting to be breached have skilled system administrators.
Political Motives: These types of attacks do occur. One occurred only one
month after the 11 Sep 01 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Hackers
captured and defaced the website of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration Center. The message simply stated there would be more attacks of this
type [Mid01].

7

2.2 Honeypot Basics
A honeypot is a security resource whose value lies in being probed, attacked or
compromised [ZZQ03]. If no one attacks a honeypot, then no data is captured. The basic
assumption means any connection is suspicious since a honeypot holds no information of
value. Some honeypot security goals are prevention, detection and reaction [Spi03a].
Traditional honeypots are production type and protect a target system from attack
and as well as detect attacks. This type of honeypot alerts the system administrator who
can then actively defend the network.
A research honeypot is used to learn new attack methods. Primarily established
at universities, they provide more interactive opportunities for attackers. Effective data
control must be exercised to prevent attacks from the research honeypot to other
computer systems.
Honeynets are comprised of multiple honeypots and are mainly used for research
purposes and are often standard production systems. Honeynets are more interactive than
honeypots and resemble an actual network [ZZQ03].
Data control and data capture are the two basic requirements in all honeypots.
The main tasks are luring attackers and capturing their data for further research. Data
control is a must to avoid the attacker using the honeypot to attack other systems.
2.3 Defensive Countermeasures
Patches: Keeping the network secure with hotfixes, patches and service packs
can be a full-time job for system administrators [MSK03]. This type of reactive
maintenance must be accomplished diligently to maintain a given level of protection.
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Procedures such as updating virus scanners, keeping patches current and disabling
unnecessary services can prevent attackers from exploiting your network [Spi03a]. If a
known exploit has been published, blackhats will use it quickly, often before the system
administrators can install the patches. Patches are necessary, but are a reactive means of
defending the network.
Boundary Protection: The primary equipment used to protect the information
that crosses the network boundary is the boundary router [Tar04]. External routers and
firewalls basically divide the organization’s intranet from the Internet. Putting a web
server on the Internet without installing a firewall in front of the web server is simply not
done in today’s security conscience environment [MSK03]. Firewalls can be either
hardware or software or both. The location of the firewall and honeypot are very
important. The hacker must be able to access and then transmit, albeit in a restricted
way, from the hacked honeypot.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS): An IDS monitors all inbound and outbound
traffic and searches for suspicious patterns that may indicate an attack. Some IDS’s
compare captured traffic with a large database of attack signatures. Attacks can be
detected; however, the vast amount of traffic often causes system administrators to
overlook the attacks. Furthermore, IDS systems often have a large number of false
positive and false negative alerts [LLO03].
Internal System Controls: Many authentication tools on a network simply lock
out an account after three failed attempts. To unlock the account, a user must physically
present credentials to the system administrator. Passwords are encrypted when
transmitted over the web and a strong password policy enforcement tool is often
9

implemented. The weakest part of any network is a careless user who reveals their user
ID and password. Accounts not used in a prescribed amount of time should be deleted.
Temporary accounts should remain active for the least amount of time practicable.
Although this research doesn’t discuss in detail the above-mentioned defensive
techniques, they should be used in unison with honeypots for complete network security.
2.4 Offensive countermeasures
Honeypots: Honeypots are a relatively new technology whose primary purpose
is to gather intelligence about an attacker [Hon02]. By doing so, organizations can
potentially stop an attack or prevent a defense system failure. The very first honeypot
was implemented at the Lawrence Berkley University Lab [Sto89]. The lab had several
supercomputers and charged each user for use of the systems. When a 75-cent error
appeared, an investigation revealed an unauthorized user entered the system from an
unknown location. Even after months of investigation and systems monitoring, no
government agency (Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
National Security Administration and United States Air Force) was willing to provide any
assistance. Even so, the hacker was tracked to a foreign city. Due to a non-digital
telephone switch, the foreign telephone company needed the hacker to stay on-line for
nearly two hours to determine who the attacker was.
Ultimately, several huge files the hacker wanted were provided so that he would
be on-line long enough for the telephone technicians to perform a manual trace. The
data, although not termed such at this time, was the “honey” for the hacker. Through
previous observations, the hacker was known to be searching for military type data. So,
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several were created that appeared to be “top secret ultra-classified material”. For
example, Figure 1 contains a portion of one of the files read by the hacker [Sto89]:

Figure 1: Example of Honey in Cuckoo's Nest
With this letter and others similar to it, the hacker found several enticing data
elements he could use to hack into the fictitious SDINET. This first honeypot allowed
the hacker to reach outbound sites through his lab. However, a system was developed
through which all of the hacker’s activities were monitored. When the hacker was
actually acquiring useful data, the data terminals would be manually shorted to induce
noise over the data link that prevented the hacker from acquiring the data. The hacker
acquired several user accounts and passwords from e-mail messages. And unfortunately,
the hacker was also able to use several default passwords in routers that were not reset by
system administrators.
2.5 Legal Issues
Determining whether honeypots are illegal is not a simple question. The advice
of a competent lawyer is always prudent when honeypots are to be deployed. In
[Spi03a], Richard Salgado, US Department of Justice, considered the following three
legal issues:
1) Laws that restrict your right to monitor user activities,
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2) Address the risk that attackers will misuse your system to harm others, and
3) If the honeypot will be used to catch and prosecute attackers, the possibility
that the defendant will claim entrapment.
The Fourth Amendment (protection from unlawful search and seizure) to the US
Constitution may also apply. This amendment, however, only applies to government
agencies. A private entity can deploy a honeypot and monitor users without worrying
about violating the Fourth Amendment [Spi03a].
The Wiretap Act forbids anyone from intercepting any communications, including
electronic sniffing, unless one of their specific exceptions has been violated. Some of
these exceptions include “provider protection” and “consent of a party”. A computer
network owner could use the “provider protection” as an argument to protect a service.
Using the “consent of a party” exception as the basis for sniffing a network would
involve the use of a warning banner. If you rely on a warning banner, take care to only
sniff the bannered ports. Figure 2 is one example of a warning banner [Spi03a].

Figure 2: Example of a Warning Banner

The Patriot Act exception expressly authorizes warrantless monitoring of hackers
by the government in certain situations. In order to legally monitor or allow someone to
act on the behalf of the government, the following must occur:
12

1) The network’s owner has authorized the interception,
2) The person sniffing the network is engaged in a lawful investigation, and
3) That person has a reasonable basis to believe that intercepted communications
will be relevant to the lawful investigation.
The honeypot should be strictly monitored to reduce the risk of it being used to
harm others. An unattended honeypot will quickly become part of the problem trying to
be corrected. If a honeypot does compromise a host, accepted procedure is to call a
credible third party, such as the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), rather
than contact the affected host directly [Mcc03c].
Entrapment is often an overstated risk for honeypot owners. Entrapment is a
narrow defense a defendant can use to avoid conviction. However, entrapment can only
apply when the government acted in a manner that actually caused the defendant to
commit the crime [Spi03]. The entrapment doctrine doesn’t apply to private honeypot
owners.
2.6 Classifying Honeypots
Low-interaction honeypots collect a minimal amount of information, mainly IP
headers involved in an attack [Spi03a], and work primarily by emulating systems and
services [Hon04a]. These types of honeypots are easier to deploy and are usually
installed with “point and click” type of software. Minimal risks are incurred, as the
hacker is severely limited in his behavior. To ensure due diligence, use of the latest
version of honeypot software and include all patches is warranted [Spi03a]. New attacks
can be identified and IP addresses collected in certain cases [Bau02].
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High-interaction honeypots, as their name indicates, are different from lowinteraction. They provide entire operating systems and do not merely emulate a
computer. High-interaction honeypots are real computers with real applications to attack.
High-interaction honeypots capture the attacker’s communications, such as internet relay
chats or e-mails. Ensuring effective data control mechanisms are in place constitutes due
diligence [Spi03a]. High-interaction honeypots have a very high level of risk as attackers
have real operating systems that can be used to attack other systems. Furthermore, they
are complex to install and must be built manually. Finally, more complexity is involved
in establishing rules so attackers cannot use the system to attack other computers.
2.7 Overview of Six Honeypots
BackOfficer Friendly (BOF) is a simple and free low-interaction production
honeypot designed to run on most Windows system. It is extremely easy to install, easy
to configure and easy to maintain. The services are small though as it simply listens on
ports with limited emulation capabilities. The security resource center provides a free
download for personal use only [NFR05].
Specter is a low-interaction production honeypot commercially supported and sold
by NetSec. Specter emulates different operating systems and vulnerabilities than can
BOF, but less than the remaining four honeypots discussed below. It is easy to maintain
and deploy with a low risk of damaging other non-honeypot sites [Spi03a].
HoneyD is an OpenSource low-interaction production honeypot designed for the
Unix platform. Developed by Neils Provos in April 2002, it introduces some new
concepts for honeypots [Spi03a]. It monitors networks of entire systems rather than one
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IP address. When probes against unknown addresses occur, it assumes that address and
then interacts with the attacker. HoneyD is a free technology and relatively easy to install
via a command line interface. HoneyD.com provides a free download [Hon05].
Homemade honeypots are created by individuals and since no two are alike, they
will range from low to high-interaction. They can be both production and research type.
ManTrap (renamed Decoy Server) is a commercial honeypot sold by Recourse
(Symantec) and serves as a high-interaction production type resource. It doesn’t emulate
any services. It takes an operating system and creates up to four virtual operating
systems. These virtual systems have the same functionality as standard production
systems. Since it is a commercial product, ManTrap is extremely easy to install and
maintain. It will not only capture scans and unauthorized connections, it will also detect
unknown attacks, blackhat conversations or new vulnerabilities. Due to its operating
system, this production or research honeypot can be used to attack other systems. One
major constraint is that ManTrap is currently limited to the Solaris operating system
[Sym05].
Honeynets are nothing more than a variety of standard systems deployed within a
highly controlled network. This network captures all activity and decreases risk by
containing the attacker’s activity. The honeynets complexity lies in building the
controlled network that both captures and controls all activities that are occurring in the
honeypots. This complexity also makes it a very high risk. Therefore, there is little
production value in honeynets and nearly all are research honeypots.

15

Honeynets are divided into two categories, Gen I and II. Factors such as
resources, types of hackers and attacks and overall experience dictate which one to
choose.
Gen I honeynets are the simpler technology to deploy [LCO03]. Developed in
1999, they are somewhat limited in data capture and data control ability. But, they are
highly effective in detecting “bots” or beginner level attacks. The limitations in data
control (no outbound traffic) make it fairly simple for a hacker to fingerprint or identify
them as a honeynet. Since the machines are normally default installations of various
operating systems, hackers do not see any “honey” to attract them.
Gen II honeynets were developed in 2002 [LCO03]. The main focus of
improvement was data control. Gen I honeynets used a firewall to limit or totally block
outbound connections. This is effective data control but will not attract skilled blackhats.
Gen II honeynets provide data control by examining outbound traffic and determining
whether to pass, block or even modify the packets to make them benign. As expected,
Gen II honeynets are more complex than Gen I honeynets. Gen II honeynets can be
defined as Gen I Honeynets with layer 2 devices or applications for the purpose of traffic
manipulation [Tor02].
2.8 Blackhat Trends
The Honeynet Project has noticed four trends in the blackhat’s tools and tactics
[Hon02]. Scanning tactics are becoming increasingly aggressive. In the past, blackhats
would try to identify vulnerable systems. Now the trend is to just identify a service and
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try to exploit it over almost any system. This thwarts the common technique of “security
through obscurity”.
Encryption techniques make tracking hackers much more difficult. Once a
system is compromised, blackhats will use secure shell (SSH) instead of telnet to control
the exploited system.
Rootkits essentially automate the entire process of taking control of a system.
More advanced rootkits such as Adore modify the kernel of the operating system. The
binaries of the system are not modified so programs like Tripwire (monitoring tool) can
no longer detect when a rootkit has been installed.
The last trend is worms that not only automate the probing and attacking of
systems but also are self-replicating. Traditionally, worms were limited to Windowsbased systems. However, beginning in early 2001, worms such as Ramen, Lion and
Sadmind/IIS were created to attack UNIX-based systems. The severity of worms has
rapidly grown with the increasing reliance on the Internet for critical infrastructure
[PSW02].
2.9 Current Research (other than the Honeynet Project)
Georgia Tech University Honeynet to Detect Exploited Systems [LLO03]
Georgia Tech University has over 20,000 students and faculty in 69 separate
departments with nearly 35,000-networked computers. The average Internet throughput
is 600Mbps and the network processes nearly four terabytes of data daily. The
Information Security Directorate (ISD), one of seven directorates operating under the
Office of Information Technology (OIT), is responsible for education on security issues,
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assessing current policies, assisting in strengthening technical resources and developing
strategies to react to incidents that affect the network.
The ISD does not run a firewall at the Internet connection to the campus.
Individual departments do run firewalls tailored to their respective security requirements.
The ISD does operate an IDS at the gateway to monitor known exploits. Suspicious
traffic is not curtailed, but undergoes a follow-on investigation.
The Georgia Tech Gen I Honeynet was established in the summer of 2002 with
open source software and equipment no longer used for production value. Initially
established on one computer, it now consists of three different machines running various
operating systems. OIT provided the IP address range and Georgia Tech owns it.
The rc.firewall script from The Honeynet Alliance established the firewall with
Data Control for the honeynet. This script provides Network Address Translation (NAT)
for the target machines.
SNORT is open source software that monitors the network. It is primarily
signature-based with anomaly plug-ins available. The system monitors the honeynet
using a Network Interface Card (NIC) set to promiscuous mode. The NIC card does not
have an assigned IP address and thus the network monitoring system is invisible to the
hacker. Two sessions of SNORT run simultaneously. One matches signatures of
potential hostile activities against Honeynet bound traffic. Georgia Tech uses the
Analysis Console for Intrusion Detection (ACID) developed by the CERT, which aids
analysis of alerts generated by SNORT. The other SNORT session runs in packet capture
mode, capturing all traffic to and from the Honeynet. The monitoring console is isolated
from the honeynet network and provides data capture.
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The data collected is stored in two separate locations for security. Alerts triggered
by SNORT are stored in a SQL database and analyzed on a daily basis. The threecomputer network honeynet review took at least one hour per day. Ethereal analyzed the
data and displays the source and destination addresses, protocol used, source and
destination ports and packet contents.
During the six-month experiment, this honeynet detected 16 compromised
systems on the network. These included both worms, exploits and individual systems
targeted and compromised by hackers. The OIT was alerted each time a compromised
occurred. Sometimes the compromise was already known and other times it was
unknown. This demonstrated the benefit of the honeynet.
One system’s password was compromised by a hacker and then used to connect to
another system. The hacker also established a backdoor to connect later. The honeynet
team knew of the backdoor and diligently monitored it to observe the hacker’s actions.
Several days after compromising this system, the hacker returned through the backdoor to
connect to another system. Without the Honeynet team, the OIT team could not have
discovered the malicious user.
The lessons learned by the Georgia Tech team were [LLO03]:
1) Start small. Begin initially with a single machine.
2) Maintain good relations with your enterprise administrators. These are the
people that will benefit the most from your research.
3) Focus on attacks and exploits originating from within your enterprise
network. These will cause the most severe damage as they have already
been compromised.
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4) Don’t publish the IP address range of the Honeynet.
5) Don’t underestimate the amount of time required to analyze the data
collected from the Honeynet. It must be examined daily and can take
weeks to fully document an attack.
6) Powerful machines are not necessary to establish the Honeynet.
Connection Redirection Applied to Production Honeypots
Honeypots can be built from virtual machines. Using these virtual machines,
attacks to a legitimate system are redirected to the honeypot posing as the original
destination without the attacker’s knowledge. Therefore,
1) Attacks against the legitimate server are neutralized,
2) The attacker is less apt to fingerprint the honeypot, and
3) Successful attacks can be studied and used to protect the legitimate server
against further attacks.
The key to attack redirection is packet filtering. Packet filtering occurs numerous
times as packets travel the Internet. Which criteria to filter on is the key question. For
example, a key port to attack is port 80 (HTTP). If an attacker attempts the latest IIS
exploit on a web server with port 80 active, the packet payload is a clear indication that
this may be a malicious activity. A routing device could route this packet to the honeypot
versus the production system. SNORT uses signature files that match characteristics of
certain communications, so it is less likely the honeypot will be fingerprinted.
Once a signature is matched, the traffic is redirected from the production system
to the honeynet system. SNORT and other IDS’s are passive monitors that do not redirect
traffic. IPtables is a robust and stateful firewall that uses string matching for redirection.
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Consider an example of this using the file robots.txt. All requests for this file will be
logged and an alert will be generated via rules established in the IPTables command.
IPTables commands are entered via the command line.
A SNORT Signature Rule is then used to discover an exploit using a buffer
overflow in the WebDAV component of Microsoft’s IIS Web Server. Using this
modified rule, the traffic will now be redirected to honeypot’s IP address.
To use this redirection method, four criteria must be met [LLO03].
1) An attacker must not be aware of the routing device between him and the
web server.
2) A legitimate user must not be affected at anytime. Non-malicious traffic
should not be redirected.
3) A routing device must not affect the Web server and normal request must
still reach the server.
4) Honeypots must be able to collect information on the attack and an
attacker must not launch attacks against other systems.
Pelletier [Pel04] began tests by sending legitimate requests that reached the server
with no redirection. A port scan (using Nmap) then tested the redirection rules. Tcpdump
proved that the “attack” was redirected to the honeypot. The Nmap outputs on the
attacking machine provided no indication the scan was redirected.
Basic port redirection is possible; however, there are still questions to be
answered. First, TCP, unlike UDP, requires a three-way handshake. When using string
matching to redirect packets, the honeypot was receiving packets that ultimately were
dropped since no session was established between the sender/attacker and the honeypot.
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All UDP traffic was redirected without incidence. However, only the TCP initial traffic
was captured causing a non-robust solution. Attackers can quickly fingerprint this type
of honeypot until more research has remedied the problem.
2.10 Summary
Honeypot’s only value lies in being probed, attacked or compromised. They
should not have any production value. Hackers are becoming more creative in ways to
exploit computer networks and system administrators must respond. In addition to
established defensive countermeasures, the honeypot provides a proactive approach to
defending networks. Legal issues must be addressed in accordance with established law.
In order to attract the more skillful blackhats, honeypots have moved to their second
generation. These types of honeypots are more disguised and less apt to be discovered or
fingerprinted. Although a new technology, current research has proven honeypots to be a
viable resource for network protection.
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3. Methodology
3.1 Problem Definition
Computer exploits and attacks have become commonplace in today’s computerdependant society. Simply connecting to the Internet exposes computer systems to
attacks by hackers. Once the hacker compromises a system, it can also be used to attack
other systems. Often the blackhat community is ahead of the government agencies tasked
with detecting and preventing the attacks.
A computer exploit is software that takes advantage of vulnerability, leading to
privilege escalation or denial of service on a computer system. A non-intrusive scan that
includes a simple scan of the target system's attributes (e.g., inspecting the file system for
specific files or file versions, checking the registry for specific values, scanning for
missing security updates, port scanning to discover which services are listening) is not
considered an exploit. Intrusive scanning actually tries to exploit the vulnerabilities the
scanner is looking for.
Goals: The goal of this research is to identify exploits in incoming network
traffic.
Hypothesis: Using system log data normally collected by operating systems,
exploits can be recognized.
Approach: Using an accredited honeypot, system activity is collected and
compared to characteristics of known exploits. A decision tree is used to recognize
known exploits and identify previously unknown exploits as well.
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3.2 System Boundaries
The system under test (SUT) is the Exploit Prediction System (EPS). The
component under test (CUT) is the decision tree matrix. Log data, which constitute the
workload to the system, arrive via the honeypot to the EPS.
The honeypot for this research is owned by the Air Force Information Warfare
Center (AFIWC) and physically located in the AFIT computer laboratory. The Computer
Network Defense and Response System (CNDRS) is shown in Figure 3 and serves the
following Information Operations roles: intrusion profiling, computer network defense,
threat response, and data forensic collection.

Figure 3: CNDRS Suite Used For Research
The CNDRS is used for computer network defense, intelligence gathering and law
enforcement. This research uses the intelligence-gathering portion of the CNDRS.
[AFI04a] and [AFI04b] provide much more in-depth information about the CNDRS.
The CNDRS specific components are [LM04]:
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•

Automated Security Incident Measurement (ASIM) system
o Intrusion detection tool for monitoring Air Force networks

•

CNDRS ASIM Gateway Environment (CAGE)
o Containment and honeypot risk reduction tool

•

Common Intrusion Detection Director System (CIDDS)
o Sorts, filters and analyzes received information in real time
o Ethereal 0.10.5 is installed on this system. Ethereal is a network
traffic sniffer or a protocol analyzer. Ethereal is freely available for
UNIX/Linux and Microsoft Windows from the Ethereal web site:
http://www.ethereal.com
o Ethereal is used to analyze and definitively prove exploits.

•

Log Host
o Centralized location for forensic honeypot data collection

•

File Transfer Protocol (FTP) version wu-2.6.1-18 honeypot
o Allows anonymous read only access and entices hostile intruders
o Highest incoming log data of the AFIT CNDRS
o The following patches are installed:


Openssl-0.9.6b-32.7.i686.rpm



Openssl095a-0.9.5a-20.7.i386.rpm



Openssl-perl-0.9.6b-32.7.i386 rpm



Openssl-devel-0.9.6b-32.7.i386 rpm



Openssl-0.9.6b-32.7.i386 rpm



Kernel-2.4.18-27.7.x.i686.rpm
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•

Windows 20000 Internet Information Services (IIS) version 5.0 v1.0
honeypot
o Read only access with upload and download denial
o 2nd highest incoming log data of the AFIT CNDRS
o The following Microsoft patches are installed:


KB329115 that corrects the certificate validation flaw that
could enable identity spoofing vulnerability.



KB823182 that corrects vulnerability in Authenticode
verification.



KB823559 that corrects a buffer overrun in the HTML
converter.



KB824105 that corrects a flaw in NETBIOS.



KB825119 that corrects a buffer overrun in Windows Help
and Support Center.



KB826232 that corrects a buffer overrun in Windows
Troubleshooter ActiveX Control.



KB828035 that corrects a buffer overrun in Messenger
Service.



KB828741 that corrects the Microsoft RPC/DCOM remote
shell vulnerability.



KB828749 that corrects a buffer overrun in the Workstation
Service.
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KB837001 that corrects Microsoft Jet Database Engine
vulnerability.

•

Computer Hackers Area of Forensic Facades (CHAFF)
o Virtual honeypot tool
o 3rd highest incoming log data of the AFIT CNDRS

•

False Logon w/Automated Redirection for Examination (FLARE)
o Allows remote redirection of activity

CNDRS honeypot components are used to attract intruders. Since there is no
production data on the network, there is no need to redirect the attacker(s). All attacks
are directed to the honeypots. The honeypot keeps the intruders occupied while
providing and collecting forensic evidence.
3.3 System Services
The EPS provides two services. First, log data is captured and analyzed. Second,
a prediction of future exploits is calculated. Service outcomes are log data of exploits or
merely port scans of the destination port.
3.4 Workload
The workload for the system is log data provided by the unknown black hat
community. The workload characteristics include:
•

Attack duration measured in seconds

•

Source IP

•

Destination IP
o FTP or IIS
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•

Source port

•

Destination port

•

Bytes sent

•

Bytes received

•

Packets sent

•

Packets received

3.5 Performance metrics of the EPS
The metrics used to measure the performance of the system include:
Success: Correctly identifying exploits.
Failure: Inability to identify possible exploits.
False negatives may occur with low and slow attacks from sophisticated hackers
who penetrate the honeypot. Low and slow attacks are when a very patient attacker
executes a few probes at a time over the course of days or weeks, to avoid detection.
These attacks are outside the scope of this research due to time contraints.
False positives occur when AFWIC initiates a communication session to upgrade
system data, to install new software or simply to monitor their system. The source IP
identifies these false positives and prevents them from being identified as an exploit.
3.6 Parameters
A parameter is a characteristic of the system or workload that affects
performance. The EPS parameters are:
•

Source IP

•

Destination IP
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•

Source port

•

Destination port

•

Bytes sent

•

Bytes received

•

Packets sent

•

Packets received

•

Attack duration measured in seconds

•

Network Protocol

•

The decision tree parameters are:

•

Bytes received by the Honeypot

•

Bytes sent from the Honeypot

3.7 Factors
Factors varied in this experiment are the bytes received by the honeypot and the
bytes transmitted by the honeypot. During the four-week EPS training period, these two
factors provided the best snapshot of an exploit. As this research attempts to quickly
predict an exploit, finding the least amount of factors possible weighed heavily in
designing the matrix.
3.8 Evaluation Technique
The direct measurement of a real system is used for this experiment. The AFIT
honeypot is an accredited honeypot in use for research purposes only and provides the
best means to reach the research goal.
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The network topology is shown in Figure 4. The honeypots are located behind
the AFIT boundary router and also have the protection of a firewall. There is no AFIT
internal access to the honeypots. The only access is from outside the AFIT campus. The
number of virtual honeypots is not limited by hardware availability. The VLANs
connectivity allows monitoring by outside agencies and also redirection of the virtual
honeypots if required. The two physical honeypots, FTP Server and IIS Web Server, do
not have the guest account login feature locked out and will allow anonymous log-in.
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100
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LO OP

W IC 1 OK
DSU
CPU
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Figure 4: AFIT Honeypot Network Topology

3.9 Experimental Design
The experimental design is a full factorial design with replications. The direct
measurement experiment has an unknown number of total possible captured exploits.
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The total number of weekly possible exploits is anticipated to be over 100 [LM04]. To
ensure a high number of exploits, known exploits are directed to the honeypots using a
known exploit generator [Moo04].
Decision theory dictates the decision process must be trained before
implementation. Metasploit [Moo04] provides known exploits to the decision tree
matrix. Metasploit version 2.4 has seven different exploits against IIS systems. Of these
seven, five are for services on the honeypot IIS. According to Dr. Gilbert Peterson,
Assistant Professor of Engineering and Management at AFIT who specializes in decision
theoretic planning, the normal percentage of events used to train a decision process is 60
– 80 percent [Pet05]. For this experiment, four of the five exploits were chosen to train
the system on predicting IIS exploits.
For the FTP server, the FTPD Glob vulnerability was chosen to train the system.
The problem is not a typical buffer overflow or format string vulnerability, but a
combination of two bugs: an implementation of the glob command that does not
properly return an error condition when interpreting the string ~ {, and then frees memory
which may contain user supplied data [Sec01]. This is a well known exploit and thus
selected as a training tool. Finding FTP exploits proved much more difficult to find and
launch than finding IIS exploits. This training period lasted from 17 April to 14 May
2005 (four weeks). The period ended only when the EPS had been successfully trained.
The EPS Decision Tree Matrix, derived from the EPS training period, is shown in
Figure 5. The decision tree has two factors. Pilot studies indicated these are good
indicators of an actual exploit. By sending known exploits to the EPS and analyzing the
results, the decision tree matrix was then finalized. Several possible indicators were
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analyzed during this initial research phase. The next phase, analysis and results, should
demonstrate whether these are good indicators.

Figure 5: EPS Decision Tree Matrix
The decision tree has four different criteria to consider. The first decision is from
the “Bytes Sent to the Honeypot”. From the EPS training period, the criteria of greater
than 30 bytes or less than or equal to 30 bytes was chosen. Above 30 bytes indicates an
exploit as proved during the training period. Equal to or below 30 bytes indicates there is
no exploit.
The next decision is the “Bytes Received from the Honeypot”. From the EPS
training period, the criteria of above or below 1,500 bytes were chosen. Above 1,500
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bytes indicates an exploit as proved during the EPS training period. Below 1,500 bytes
may indicate an exploit against a patched service or non-offered service or may indicate
an FTP Banner Retrieval.
The EPS training period data resulted in the decision tree matrix having one of
four decisions or outputs. They are:


Bytes Sent > 30 bytes and Bytes Rxd > 1,500 bytes indicates an exploit



Bytes Sent > 30 bytes and Bytes Rxd ≤ 1,500 bytes indicates a possible
exploit against a patched / non-resident service



Bytes Sent ≤ 30 bytes and Bytes Rxd > 1,500 bytes indicates no exploit,
but an FTP banner retrieval



Bytes Sent ≤ 30 bytes and Bytes Rxd ≤ 1,500 bytes indicates no exploit,
but a port scan.

3.10

Summary
The ability to collect and analyze detected exploits is vital for this experiment.

This chapter described the goals, hypothesis and approach for the research. System
boundaries, including the SUT and CUT, were discussed. The workload, performance
metrics and parameters were identified. The decision tree matrix was introduced and
discussed. Additionally, the analysis design and evaluation technique were discussed.
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4. Analysis and Results
4.1 Introduction
The honeypot log data for this Chapter was captured from 15 May 2005 to 16 July
2005 (nine weeks). The CIDDS 3.1 navigator software provides the querying tool for
this experiment. All log data coming into the IIS server and FTP server are captured by
the CIDDS software. No data is filtered.
4.2 Querying the System
At the initial login screen, the “query” and “advance query” options are chosen.
The advanced query page is now active as shown in Figure 6 on the following page.
Options chosen for the advance query are:
o Start Day (2005-06-26, for this particular query)
o End Day (2005-06-29, for this particular query)
o Source IP
o Destination IP (either 129.28.248.27 or 129.28.248.26)
o Source Port
o Destination Port
o Bytes Sent
o Bytes Received
o Packets Sent
o Packets Received
o Duration in seconds (data is ordered descending by duration)
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Figure 6: Advance Query

4.3 Query Results
The query results are shown in Figure 7 on the following page. Other fields in the
query results are the assigned designator – a nomenclature to identify which AFIWC
honeypot is being queried. Also, the number 6 protocol (designated by AFIWC) is
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), which comprised nearly all of the log data. TCP is
one of the core protocols of the Internet protocol suite. Using TCP, programs on
networked computers can create connections to one another, over which they can send
data. The protocol guarantees that data sent by one endpoint will be received in the same
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order by the other, and without any pieces missing. It also distinguishes data for different
applications (such as a Web server and an email server) on the same computer. TCP
supports many of the Internet's most popular applications.
A small amount (4 of 8,444) of log data was number 17 (designated by AFIWC),
the Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP). ISAKMP is
a cryptographic protocol which forms the basis of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
protocol. IKE forms the basis for IP security (IPSEC). All captures were from within the
AFIWC network.

Figure 7: Query Results
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Total log data captured for the nine-week period were 8,444 entries. The subset
of exploits, exploits against patched / non-offered services, and FTP banner retrievals are
contained in Appendix A.
The query in Figure 7 is typical of the captured log data. For this particular threeday period, there were 55 rows of captured log data. This screen shot displays 40 of
these rows. An initial view of the 40 rows displayed shows 32 of the rows have “0” bytes
received and “0” bytes sent. These are simple port scans to detect open ports. Six
exploits meet the EPS decision tree matrix criteria for an exploit. To further investigate,
the user must click on the STARTTIME for the particular log data row. Another screen
is displayed, showing the transcript for the chosen log data. This transcript is an Ethereal
product and is explained on the following pages.
4.4 Exploits Recognized by the EPS
The following are some exploits that were recognized by the EPS. For example,
log data from 29 Jun 2005, 16:08:44 GMT is shown in Figure 8 on the following page.
The left side of the transcript is the activity of the source IP or the computer attempting
connection to the honeypot. The right side of the transcript is the activity from the
destination IP or the honeypot computer. Data from the initiator host (bytes sent in the
EPS) and data from the receiver host (bytes received in the EPS) are the truth data needed
to determine if the log is an exploit. The Open Source Vulnerability Database [OSV05]
and Secunia Stay Secure [Sec05] are excellent sources to verify vulnerabilities. In this
example, the initiator host command “PASV” is an exploit that attempts to consume all
available ports on the system by issuing multiple PASV commands. All exploits
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captured during this research are detailed in Appendix B. This particular exploit, PASV,
was captured four times.

Figure 8: Captured Exploit 29 Jun 2005, 16:08:44GMT
The user can further investigate the data by clicking “Analyze Raw Data”. This
screen will analyze down to the packet level. Figure 9 is the raw data for this exploit.
With the EPS, only those predicted exploits should be analyzed at this level.
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Figure 9: Packet Level Analysis
Another one of the six log data identified as exploits by the EPS in Figure 7 is the
29 Jun 2005, 13:51:28 GMT line of data. This transcript is shown in Figure 10 above and
is identical to log data 29 Jun 2005, 14:02:31GMT. This exploit is the IIS Web
Application Source Code Disclosure that attempts to dump the source code of a remote
web application using a variety of techniques. Log data line 29 Jun 2005, 13:52:28GMT
worked in unison with log data line 29 Jun 2005, 13:52:29GMT (pictured in Figure 11
below). Log data line 29 Jun 2005, 14:02:31 worked in unison also with log data line 29
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Jun 2005, 14:02:31 (2). This last log data line is identical to Figure 11 and this exploit
was captured six times.
4.4.1

IIS Web Application Source Code Disclosure

Figure 10: Captured Exploit 29 Jun 2005, 13:51:28GMT
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Figure 11: Captured Exploit 29 Jun 2005, 13:51:29

4.4.2

Grim’s Ping
The Grim’s Ping is an automatic exploit that attempts to develop tools and

information for a further and more harmful attack. The exploit will attempt to log into
multiple directories and perform a thorough scan of the FTP server to allow information
needed for the black hat to plan future attacks. It will attempt to upload the file
“space.asp”, an Active Server Page that displays even more information about the host.
Test files are loaded to verify the FTP server is capable of hosting an unknown site. The
exploit is pictured below in Figure 12 below and was captured three times.
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Figure 12: Captured Exploit 9 Jun 2005, 13:57:45GMT

4.4.3

IIS 4.0/5.0 .HTR Buffer Overflow
This exploit attempts a buffer overflow attack against Windows 2000 IIS 5.0

systems. This may lead to denial-of-service conditions, but will not provide an attacker
with interactive access to the host system. This exploit is pictured in Figure 13 on the
following page and was captured four times.
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Figure 13: Captured Exploit 13 Jul 2005, 16:15:18GMT

4.4.4

IIS 5.0 Printer Buffer Overflow
This vulnerability arises when a buffer of approximately 420 bytes is sent within

the HTTP Host header for a “.printer ISAPI” request. Upon execution, a buffer overflow
occurs within IIS and the x486 instruction pointer is overwritten. Windows 2000 will
restart the web server if it has crashed. This automatic restart feature makes it easier for
remote attacks to execute code against Windows IIS 5.0 web servers. The attacker can
have the EIP jump to the exploit code and then the attacker has system level access. The
exploit is pictured in Figure 14 and was captured three times.
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Figure 14: Captured Exploit 13 Jul 2005, 16:35:50GMT

4.4.5

OPTS “UTF8 On” Command
The “OPTS” (options) command provides ability to set options on the server. The

“UTF8 On” flag sets the encoding to Uniform Transformation Format of 8 bits. UTF-8 is
especially useful for transmission over 8-bit Electronic Mail systems. Although not a
recognized exploit, someone attempting to change the options on the server should cause
concern. This exploit is picture in Figure 15 and was captured twice.
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Figure 15: Captured Exploit 13 Jul 2005, 14:56:23GMT

4.5 Exploits Against Patched or Non-Offered Services
The following exploits against patched or non-offered services were captured by
EPS.
4.5.1

FrontPage Exploit
A remote overflow exists in Microsoft FrontPage. The fp30reg.dll fails when

handling chunked encoded data resulting in a boundary overflow and an attacker can
allow execution of arbitrary code granting system level privileges. The FrontPage
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service is not offered on the honeypot. The exploit is pictured in Figure 16 below and
was attempted 43 times, all on 13 Jul 05, spaced 58 seconds apart and against port 80.

Figure 16: Captured Attempted Exploit 13 Jul 2005, 18:25:50GMT

4.5.2

RPC DCOM Exploit
Microsoft Windows platforms contain a potential vulnerability that may allow a

remote attacker to execute arbitrary code. The issue is due to a flaw in the Remote
Procedure Call (RPC) Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) interface that does
not properly sanitize remote requests. If an attacker sends a specially crafted message to
the server, they may be able to crash the service or execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM
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privileges. This exploit was corrected by Microsoft patch KB828741 and is loaded on
the system. This attempted exploit against a known patched system is in Figure 17 and
was captured seven times.

Figure 17: Captured Attempted Exploit 29 Jun 2005, 14:18:51GMT

4.6 Outlier Discussion
The research encountered three outliers that could not fit into any of the EPS
categories. The first captured log data involved a session time out. The parameter of 900
seconds is set by the honeypot to close any connection when no activity occurs in the last
900 seconds. This data is shown in Figure 18 and was captured only once.
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Figure 18: Captured Log Data 30 Jun 2005, 14:21:04 GMT
Although not an exploit, no session activity for 900 seconds (or any other set
value) should cause alarm. This would not constitute a port scan or FTP banner retrieval
so the EPS could not accurately predict this log data.
The remaining two outliers involved the RPC DCOM exploit. To determine
relevancy of a patched exploit, the patch for RPC DCOM exploit (KB828741) was
removed to see how the EPS would evaluate this exploit. Again, the RPC DCOM exploit
allows a black hat to open a remote procedure call on an unknowing system. The exploit
does not meet the criteria of bytes sent > 30 bytes, so the EPS would not predict this
exploit. However, with the known Microsoft patch applied, this would be predicted to be
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an exploit against a patched service. This exploit is shown in Figure 19 below and was
captured twice.

Figure 19: Captured Exploit 14 Jul 2005, 16:31:06GMT
Although not an outlier, the previously mentioned FrontPage exploits, 43
altogether, each had sent over 55,000 bytes to the honeypot. This met the EPS criteria of
> 30 bytes sent, but all were much more than the next most exploit or attempted exploit
of approximately 1,770 bytes sent. This may be attributable to the exploit being patched
and the “bot” attempting numerous operations before failing.
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4.7 Analysis
As mentioned previously, a total of 8,444 lines of log data were captured during
this research and a summary are depicted in Table 1 below. As expected, the
overwhelming majority of log data were simple port scans (over 98 percent). The next
amount were exploits against patched or non-offered services, although this may be
somewhat skewed since the FrontPage exploit was attempted 43 times. Recognized
exploits were the third most captured log data of 35. Finally, FTP banner retrievals were
captured the least (17 times).
Table 1: Table of Log Data Captured (8,444 total)
Exploit Against
Patched or
Non-Offered

FTP Banner

Port

Exploit

Services

Retrieval

Scan

Outliers

35 / 8,444

50 / 8,444

17 / 8,444

8,339 / 8,444

3 / 8,444

Using a 95-percent confidence level [Lil00], the upper level boundary, measured
level and lower level boundary are listed in Table 2. The confidence interval shows
enough measurements were taken to achieve a reasonable interval width (at 95%
confidence).
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Table 2: Confidence Level of Measurements Taken (at 95% level)
Exploit Against
Patched or
Confidence

Non-Offered

FTP Banner

Port

Intervals at 95%

Exploit

Services

Retrieval

Scan

Upper Level

.00529

.00768

.00310

.98901

Measured

.00414

.00627

.00225

.98698

Lower Level

.00299

.00486

.00140

.98495

4.8 EPS Accuracy
The EPS is intended only to be used on honeypots. The decision matrix simply
would not work on a production-type system. As explained earlier, the honeypot is a
non-production information system. A production-type system would have too much
approved activity to capture and analyze. The false positives and false negatives would
prove too enormous for any predictive analysis and the needed confidence level could not
be attained. The network defender would spend too much time filtering the data. Much
of the data would prove to be non-malicious and thus would waste valuable time. For all
of these reasons, honeypots were invented to attract data that should always be
considered malicious. To further enhance the honeypots, the EPS system provides an
even better analytical tool to study actual exploits.
The EPS decision tree matrix criteria are summarized below:
•

Recognized exploit equates to > 30 bytes sent and > 1,500 bytes received
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•

Attempted exploit equates to > 30 bytes sent and ≤ 1,500 bytes received

•

FTP banner retrieval equates to ≤ 30 bytes sent and > 1,500 bytes received

•

Port scan equates to ≤ 30 bytes sent and ≤ 1,500 bytes received.

Table 3 contains the statistics of the EPS success rates.
Table 3: Correct Predictions of the EPS
Exploit Against
Patched or
Recognized

Non-Offered

FTP Banner

Port

Exploit

Service

Retrieval

Scan

35 of 37

50 of 51

17 of 17

8,339 of 8,339

.9459

.9803

1.00

1.00

The EPS accurately predicted a port scan 100% of the time (8,339 of 8,339
events). The FTP Banner Retrieval also was accurately predicted 100% of the time (17
of 17 events). The port scan category proved the easiest to predict with the FTP banner
retrieval proved second easiest to predict once the size of the banner was determined.
Both of these categories do not reveal much system information to the black hat
community and need no further preventive research probing for a computer deficiency.
The 35 recognized exploits were correctly predicted as exploits, with another
two (the RPC DCOM exploit attempted with the applicable Microsoft patch removed) not
predicted (95% success rate). This category proved the second most difficult to predict.
Further analysis uncovered the following characteristics of the 35 exploits:
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Bytes sent

Bytes received

Range:

37 – 1,376

1,700 – 5,073

Mean:

403

3,075

Median:

124

2,920

These values give an excellent representation for a network defender to monitor
and further investigate these exploits down to the packet level as displayed in Figure 9.
The 50 exploits against patched or non-offered services were predicted
successfully, with one (session time-out) not predicted for a 98% success rate. Again,
these statistics may be somewhat skewed due to the FrontPage exploit executed 43 times
in one period.
Further analysis uncovered the following characteristics of the 50 exploits:
Bytes sent

Bytes received

Range:

150 – 57,116

60 – 347

Mean:

48,810

311

Mode:

56,472 (41 times)

347 (44 times)

The mode, versus the median, gives a better statistical representation of this
category due to the number of the FrontPage exploits. Again, this provides a sound point
for the system administrator to further investigate this captured log data. This category
proved the most difficult to predict.
4.9 Summary
This chapter displayed the results of the data collected during this research. It is
noted again the EPS should only be used on honeypots. It will not work to predict
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exploits on a production system. The data demonstrates the EPS is an excellent predictor
of port scans and FTP banner retrieval. Furthermore, exploits and attempted exploits
against patched or non-offered services are predicted at 95% confidence for exploits and
for the attempted exploits. The statistics of the exploits and attempted exploits captured
provide excellent reference criteria for the network defender to investigate certain log
data down to the packet level. Conclusions and recommendations for further research
are offered in the following chapter.
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5. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Goals of this Research Study
The goal of this research is simple. Using an accredited honeypot, employ an
Exploit Prediction System (EPS) that will predict when an exploit has been transmitted to
the honeypot. The EPS uses a decision tree matrix with as few criterion needed for
successful prediction. The log data coming into the honeypot is not filtered and all data
is interpreted and categorized.
5.2 EPS Uses
Most people involved in defending information networks only perform this
crucial function as part of other work tasks. As more downsizing of our workforce
occurs, the ability to spend time only on those packets of data predicted to cause harm is
a force multiplier. The less time analyzing packets that are harmless enables the network
defenders to perform other information assurance functions.
The amount of outside generated exploits was surprising. The anticipation was
numerous exploits would target the honeypot. However, this proved to be false. The
object of the research was to predict exploits. Where the exploits originated was not
under test. Using Metapsploit [Moo04], several proven exploits were sent to the
honeypots during the analysis and results phase and provided the needed research data.
5.3 Future Work
AFIT’s honeypot has been accredited since August 2004 and this is the first thesis
on honeypots. With the growing emergence of honeypots, the blackhat community now
actively scans and detects potential honeypot systems and is not attacking those
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fingerprinted systems. In [Gup04], deceptive honeypots are thoroughly discussed as the
next use for honeypots. This may prove to be an effective use, but may be too
controversial for the Air Force to have connected to their information networks. Only
further research can answer this question.
Potential research for this topic involves the Cyber Defense Exercise (CDX).
This exercise is weeklong exercise that pits Red Team aggressors against Blue Team
students in a battle to exploit and protect cyber resources and computer system services
such as e-mail, web browsing, and database access. Participants include the military
service academies, AFIT, and the Naval Postgraduate School. The National Security
Agency and the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Office sponsor the CDX.
Before the weeklong exercise begins in the spring quarter, a prerequisite class
(CSCE-528) is taught in the winter quarter. In conjunction with CSCE-528, a student
could take on the honeypots as a special project and thoroughly evaluate how the
honeypot could be used during the CDX. Early in the quarter, a temporary duty to the
AFIWC, owners of the AFIT honeypot, could prove valuable. As the owner of the four
honeypots, they are the authority and could provide much needed guidance for future
research study. Any time spent with the owners of the system will only benefit the future
research. The accredited honeypot is a valuable commodity and must be continually
researched.
5.4 Summary
This research examines how honeypots are employed for use in Information
Assurance in today’s information networks. The EPS provides a simple, passive tool that
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allows only those packets of data predicted as an exploit to be analyzed further.
Honeypots can provide a deceptive defense tool in which the attackers are deceived into
believing they are intruding into a real production system. The correct deployment,
monitoring and analysis of honeypots help in increasing our understanding of attackers'
modes of operations and tools in details. With this knowledge, the goal of defending our
information networks can be achieved.
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Appendix A. Abridged Listing of Captured Log Data
Start

#

Start

Time

Source

Day

(GMT)

IP

Dest Source Dest Bytes Bytes Pkts Pkts Dur- ProtIP

Port

Port

Sent

Rxd Sent Rxd ation ocol

1 15-May-05 20:22:33 195.117.240.131 26

45932

21

0

1545

6

3

1

6

2 18-May-05 0:19:19

69.135.191.55

26

1641

21

13

1580

6

5

3

6

3 21-May-05 8:33:32

82.35.16.87

26

3113

21

0

1582

5

4

31

6

4 23-May-05 15:47:47

192.203.2.222

26

32780

21

67

1883

18

14

18

6

5 23-May-05 15:48:07

192.203.2.222

26

32781

21

62

1883

18

14

10

6

6 23-May-05 15:48:18

192.203.2.222

26

32782

21

87

3724

22

15

27

6

7 29-May-05 18:03:16

62.38.129.2

26

4367

21

0

1582

6

4

1

6

8 1-Jun-05

6:10:43

82.234.26.221

26

3091

21

0

1978

3

10

219

6

9 3-Jun-05

13:23:27

24.232.211.16

26

1382

21

0

1545

5

3

4

6

10 5-Jun-05

3:48:45

163.20.123.1

26

2100

21

0

1582

6

4

1

6

11 5-Jun-05

11:26:43 217.187.53.197

26

62747

21

175

3659

19

17

12

6

12 6-Jun-05

11:12:06

26

3926

21

124

1919

25

14

9

6

13 6-Jun-05

12:02:53 195.110.101.42

26

3633

21

0

1582

6

4

0

6

14 9-Jun-05

13:50:34 81.244.174.253

26

59631

21

46

3473

9

8

2

6

15 9-Jun-05

16:53:55

66.162.79.55

26

2789

21

185

3695

34

28

243

6

16 9-Jun-05

17:09:59

66.162.79.55

26

2806

21

66

1899

19

16

174

6

17 9-Jun-05

17:15:05

66.162.79.55

26

2810

21

397

4072

47

39

406

6

18 10-Jun-05

1:41:34

69.135.191.55

26

4319

21

13

1580

6

5

3

6

19 11-Jun-05 16:49:46

64.233.230.53

26

1429

21

0

1582

6

4

0

6

20 13-Jun-05 13:57:45

64.233.230.53

26

4397

21

684

5073

49

50

7

6

21 16-Jun-05 12:56:54

129.92.248.71

26

37607

1

300

0

1

0

0

17

22 16-Jun-05 12:57:42

129.92.248.71

26

47376

1

300

0

1

0

0

17

207.72.6.98
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23 16-Jun-05 12:57:53

129.92.248.71

27

47376

1

300

0

1

0

0

17

24 17-Jun-05 17:12:37

81.137.93.81

26

6530

21

0

1582

6

4

0

6

25 19-Jun-05 15:43:09 84.160.148.118

26

2126

21

2

1658

7

5

0

6

26 23-Jun-05 18:00:16

129.92.248.71

26

32774

21

70

3528

22

16

847

6

27 23-Jun-05 18:00:33

129.92.248.71

26

32775 10173

0

0

2

1

830

6

28 23-Jun-05 18:37:03

129.92.248.71

26

32776

21

58

3325

19

13

12

6

29 29-Jun-05 13:51:28

129.92.248.71

27

32802

80

808

4289

7

5

0

6

30 29-Jun-05 13:51:29

129.92.248.71

27

32809

80

204

4246

7

5

0

6

31 29-Jun-05 14:02:31

129.92.248.71

27

32886

80

808

4289

7

5

0

6

32 29-Jun-05 14:02:31

129.92.248.71

27

32893

80

204

4246

7

5

0

6

33 29-Jun-05 14:14:16

129.92.248.71

27

32930

135

1770

60

7

4

0

6

34 29-Jun-05 14:18:51

129.92.248.71

27

32937

135

1770

60

7

4

1

6

35 29-Jun-05 16:00:17

129.92.248.71

26

32942

21

48

1812

15

11

496

6

36 29-Jun-05 16:08:44

129.92.248.71

26

32943

21

44

1700

13

11

938

6

37 30-Jun-05 00:28:17

129.92.250.39

27

1722

137

150

957

3

2

3

17

38 30-Jun-05 13:56:57

129.92.248.71

26

32943

21

6

0

2

1

0

6

39 30-Jun-05 13:57:12

129.92.248.71

26

32944

21

40

1804

15

13

283

6

40 30-Jun-05 14:02:09

129.92.248.71

26

32945

21

40

1804

14

12

28

6

41 30-Jun-05 14:02:59

129.92.248.71

26

32946

21

39

1803

14

10

36

6

42 30-Jun-05 14:03:51

129.92.248.71

26

32947

21

41

1804

15

13

18

6

43 30-Jun-05 14:04:37

129.92.248.71

26

32948

21

37

1804

14

12

18

6

44 30-Jun-05 14:05:05

129.92.248.71

26

32949

21

60

3463

23

16

59

6

45 30-Jun-05 14:05:22

129.92.248.71

26

32950 27883

0

845

4

3

0

6

46 30-Jun-05 14:21:04

129.92.248.71

26

32949

21

15

56

3

4

3578

6

47 6-Jul-05

19:36:23

192.203.1.218

26

4943

21

0

2327

2

14

931

6

48 7-Jul-05

00:17:55

192.203.1.218

26

1688

21

0

1780

6

7

53

6

59

49 8-Jul-05

22:42:09

4.43.98.63

26

3292

21

0

1582

6

4

1

6

50 10-Jul-05

14:45:58

68.143.90.52

26

3734

21

0

1582

6

4

0

6

51 10-Jul-05

22:47:26

69.25.82.229

26

3855

21

0

1582

6

4

1

6

52 13-Jul-05

14:31:51

129.92.248.71

27

32972

80

0

0

0

0

1

17

53 13-Jul-05

14:56:22

69.81.64.135

26

1274

21

105

3765

19

20

33

6

54 13-Jul-05

14:56:23

69.81.64.135

26

1275

21

146

3697

24

24

58

6

55 13-Jul-05

16:15:18

129.92.248.71

27

32972

80

1376 2920

7

4

0

6

56 13-Jul-05

16:20:41

129.92.248.71

27

32979

80

1014 2920

7

4

0

6

57 13-Jul-05

16:22:31

129.92.248.71

27

32981

80

1054 2920

7

4

0

6

58 13-Jul-05

16:24:09

129.92.248.71

27

32984

80

1316 2920

7

4

0

6

59 13-Jul-05

16:35:50

129.92.248.71

27

33020

80

1229 2920

7

4

0

6

60 13-Jul-05

16:38:36

129.92.248.71

27

33029

80

1229 2920

7

4

0

6

61 13-Jul-05

16:43:40

129.92.248.71

27

33032

80

1229 2920

7

4

0

6

62 13-Jul-05

17:38:55

129.92.248.71

27

33162

80

808

4289

7

5

0

6

63 13-Jul-05

17:38:58

129.92.248.71

27

33169

80

204

4246

7

5

0

6

64 13-Jul-05

17:42:11

129.92.248.71

27

33188

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

65 13-Jul-05

17:43:13

129.92.248.71

27

33291

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

66 13-Jul-05

17:44:15

129.92.248.71

27

33394

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

67 13-Jul-05

17:45:17

129.92.248.71

27

33498

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

68 13-Jul-05

17:46:19

129.92.248.71

27

33603

80

57116 347

43

16

2

6

69 13-Jul-05

17:47:21

129.92.248.71

27

33707

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

70 13-Jul-05

17:48:22

129.92.248.71

27

33843

80

57116 347

43

16

2

6

71 13-Jul-05

17:49:23

129.92.248.71

27

33984

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

72 13-Jul-05

17:50:25

129.92.248.71

27

34128

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

73 13-Jul-05

17:51:26

129.92.248.71

27

34272

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

74 13-Jul-05

17:52:27

129.92.248.71

27

34415

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

60

75 13-Jul-05

17:53:29

129.92.248.71

27

34558

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

76 13-Jul-05

17:54:30

129.92.248.71

27

34699

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

77 13-Jul-05

17:55:32

129.92.248.71

27

34843

80

56472 347

43

17

2

6

78 13-Jul-05

17:56:34

129.92.248.71

27

34990

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

79 13-Jul-05

17:57:36

129.92.248.71

27

35135

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

80 13-Jul-05

17:58:37

129.92.248.71

27

35275

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

81 13-Jul-05

17:59:39

129.92.248.71

27

35421

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

82 13-Jul-05

18:00:41

129.92.248.71

27

35565

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

83 13-Jul-05

18:01:43

129.92.248.71

27

35710

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

84 13-Jul-05

18:02:44

129.92.248.71

27

35852

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

85 13-Jul-05

18:03:46

129.92.248.71

27

36000

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

86 13-Jul-05

18:04:48

129.92.248.71

27

36144

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

87 13-Jul-05

18:05:50

129.92.248.71

27

36289

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

88 13-Jul-05

18:06:51

129.92.248.71

27

36429

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

89 13-Jul-05

18:07:53

129.92.248.71

27

36574

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

90 13-Jul-05

18:08:55

129.92.248.71

27

36718

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

91 13-Jul-05

18:09:57

129.92.248.71

27

36864

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

92 13-Jul-05

18:10:58

129.92.248.71

27

37004

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

93 13-Jul-05

18:12:00

129.92.248.71

27

37148

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

94 13-Jul-05

18:13:01

129.92.248.71

27

37289

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

95 13-Jul-05

18:14:03

129.92.248.71

27

37433

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

96 13-Jul-05

18:15:05

129.92.248.71

27

37579

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

97 13-Jul-05

18:16:06

129.92.248.71

27

37719

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

98 13-Jul-05

18:17:08

129.92.248.71

27

37863

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

99 13-Jul-05

18:18:09

129.92.248.71

27

38004

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

100 13-Jul-05

18:19:11

129.92.248.71

27

38148

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

61

101 13-Jul-05

18:20:12

129.92.248.71

27

38290

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

102 13-Jul-05

18:21:14

129.92.248.71

27

38434

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

103 13-Jul-05

18:22:16

129.92.248.71

27

38578

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

104 13-Jul-05

18:23:17

129.92.248.71

27

38719

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

105 13-Jul-05

18:24:19

129.92.248.71

27

38863

80

56472 347

43

16

2

6

106 13-Jul-05

18:25:50

129.92.248.71

27

39008

80

55024 347

43

19

2

6

107 13-Jul-05

18:48:37

129.92.248.71

27

39088

135

1770

60

8

5

1

6

108 13-Jul-05

18:48:38

129.92.248.71

27

39090

4444

0

105

4

2

0

6

109 14-Jul-05 16:21:50

129.92.248.71

27

32797

135

1770

60

8

5

1

6

110 14-Jul-05 16:21:51

129.92.248.71

27

32798

4444

34

120

6

111 14-Jul-05 16:31:05

129.92.248.71

27

32813

135

1770

1

6

112 14-Jul-05 16:31:06

129.92.248.71

27

32815

4444

4

264

6

113 14-Jul-05 16:49:42

129.92.248.71

27

32825

135

1770

152

9

5

1

6

114 14-Jul-05 16:57:30

129.92.248.71

27

32834

135

1770

152

9

5

1

6

115 16-Jul-05 15:31:58 209.123.110.70

26

17893

21

0

1582

6

4

0

6

……. ………….
8444 16-Jul-05

96890 200 198
60

8

5

96742 131 161

…………. …………………. …… ……….. …….. …….. …….. …….. …… ……. …….
1:37:45

141.150.70.166

27

62

4901

10000

0

0

2

1

1

6

Appendix B. Listing of Captured Exploits by EPS Category
Exploits
Start

#

Start

Time

Source

Day

(GMT)

IP

Destination Bytes Bytes Description of
IP

Sent

Rxd Exploit

1 23-May-05 15:48:18 192.203.2.222 129.92.248.26

87

3724 NLST ~

2 23-May-05 15:47:47 192.203.2.222 129.92.248.26

67

1883 LIST

3 23-May-05 15:48:07 192.203.2.222 129.92.248.26

62

1883 LIST

4 5-Jun-05

11:26:43 217.187.53.197 129.92.248.26 175

3659 Grim's Ping

5 6-Jun-05

11:12:06

207.72.6.98

1919 LIST

6 9-Jun-05

17:15:05

66.162.79.55 129.92.248.26 397

4072 Grim's Ping

7 9-Jun-05

16:53:55

66.162.79.55 129.92.248.26 185

3695 NLST ~

8 9-Jun-05

13:50:34 81.244.174.253 129.92.248.26

46

3473 PASV

9 9-Jun-05

17:09:59

66

1899 LIST

129.92.248.26 124

66.162.79.55 129.92.248.26

10 13-Jun-05 13:57:45 64.233.230.53 129.92.248.26 684

5073 Grim's Ping

11 23-Jun-05 18:37:03 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.26

58

3325 PASV

12 23-Jun-05 18:00:16 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.26

70

3528 LIST

13 29-Jun-05 14:02:31 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 808

4289 Source Code Disclosure

14 29-Jun-05 13:51:28 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 808

4289 Source Code Disclosure

15 29-Jun-05 13:51:29 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 204

4246 Source Code Disclosure

16 29-Jun-05 14:02:31 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 204

4246 Source Code Disclosure

17 29-Jun-05 16:00:17 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.26

48

1812 SYST

18 29-Jun-05 16:08:44 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.26

44

1700 PASV

19 30-Jun-05 14:03:51 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.26

41

1804 SYST

20 30-Jun-05 14:02:09 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.26

40

1804 SYST

21 30-Jun-05 13:57:12 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.26

40

1804 SYST

63

22 30-Jun-05 14:02:59 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.26

39

1803 SYST

23 30-Jun-05 14:04:37 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.26

37

1804 SYST

24 30-Jun-05 14:05:05 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.26

60

3463 PASV

25 13-Jul-05

16:35:50 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 1229 2920 Printer Buffer Overflow

26 13-Jul-05

16:22:31 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 1054 2920 .HTR Bugger Overflow

27 13-Jul-05

16:20:41 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 1014 2920 .HTR Bugger Overflow

28 13-Jul-05

17:38:55 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 808

29 13-Jul-05

16:15:18 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 1376 2920 .HTR Bugger Overflow

30 13-Jul-05

16:24:09 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 1316 2920 .HTR Bugger Overflow

31 13-Jul-05

16:43:40 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 1229 2920 Printer Buffer Overflow

32 13-Jul-05

16:38:36 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 1229 2920 Printer Buffer Overflow

33 13-Jul-05

14:56:23

34 13-Jul-05

17:38:58 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 204

4246 Source Code Disclosure

35 13-Jul-05

14:56:22

3765 OPTS UTF8

69.81.64.135 129.92.248.26 146

69.81.64.135 129.92.248.26 105

4289 Source Code Disclosure

3697 OPTS UTF8

Attempted Exploits
Start

#

Start

Time

Source

Day

(GMT)

IP

Destination Bytes Bytes Description of
IP

Sent

Rxd Exploit

1 29-Jun-05 14:14:16 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 1770

60

RPC DCOM (patched)

2 29-Jun-05 14:18:51 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 1770

60

RPC DCOM (patched)

3 13-Jul-05

17:42:11 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

4 13-Jul-05

17:43:13 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

5 13-Jul-05

17:44:15 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

6 13-Jul-05

17:45:17 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

7 13-Jul-05

17:46:19 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 57116 347 FrontPage (non-offered)
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8 13-Jul-05

17:47:21 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

9 13-Jul-05

17:48:22 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 57116 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

10 13-Jul-05

17:49:23 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

11 13-Jul-05

17:50:25 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

12 13-Jul-05

17:51:26 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

13 13-Jul-05

17:52:27 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

14 13-Jul-05

17:53:29 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

15 13-Jul-05

17:54:30 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

16 13-Jul-05

17:55:32 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

17 13-Jul-05

17:56:34 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

18 13-Jul-05

17:57:36 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

19 13-Jul-05

17:58:37 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

20 13-Jul-05

17:59:39 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

21 13-Jul-05

18:00:41 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

22 13-Jul-05

18:01:43 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

23 13-Jul-05

18:02:44 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

24 13-Jul-05

18:03:46 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

25 13-Jul-05

18:04:48 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

26 13-Jul-05

18:05:50 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

27 13-Jul-05

18:06:51 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

28 13-Jul-05

18:07:53 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

29 13-Jul-05

18:08:55 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

30 13-Jul-05

18:09:57 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

31 13-Jul-05

18:10:58 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

32 13-Jul-05

18:12:00 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

33 13-Jul-05

18:13:01 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)
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34 13-Jul-05

18:14:03 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

35 13-Jul-05

18:15:05 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

36 13-Jul-05

18:16:06 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

37 13-Jul-05

18:17:08 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

38 13-Jul-05

18:18:09 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

39 13-Jul-05

18:19:11 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

40 13-Jul-05

18:20:12 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

41 13-Jul-05

18:21:14 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

42 13-Jul-05

18:22:16 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

43 13-Jul-05

18:23:17 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

44 13-Jul-05

18:24:19 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 56472 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

45 13-Jul-05

18:25:50 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 55024 347 FrontPage (non-offered)

46 13-Jul-05

18:48:37 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 1770

60

RPC DCOM (patched)

47 14-Jul-05 16:21:50 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 1770

60

RPC DCOM (patched)

48 14-Jul-05 16:31:05 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 1770

60

RPC DCOM (patched)

49 14-Jul-05 16:49:42 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 1770

152 RPC DCOM (patched)

50 14-Jul-05 16:57:30 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27 1770

152 RPC DCOM (patched)

FTP Banner Retrievals
Start

#

Start

Time

Source

Day

(GMT)

IP

1 18-May-05 0:19:19

Destination Bytes Bytes Description of
IP

69.135.191.55 129.92.248.26

Sent

Rxd Exploit

13

1580 FTP Banner Retrieval

2 21-May-05 8:33:32

82.35.16.87

129.92.248.26

0

1582 FTP Banner Retrieval

3 29-May-05 18:03:16

62.38.129.2

129.92.248.26

0

1582 FTP Banner Retrieval

82.234.26.221 129.92.248.26

0

1978 FTP Banner Retrieval

4 1-Jun-05

6:10:43

66

5 3-Jun-05

13:23:27 24.232.211.16 129.92.248.26

0

1545 FTP Banner Retrieval

6 5-Jun-05

3:48:45

163.20.123.1 129.92.248.26

0

1582 FTP Banner Retrieval

7 6-Jun-05

12:02:53 195.110.101.42 129.92.248.26

0

1582 FTP Banner Retrieval

8 10-Jun-05

1:41:34

69.135.191.55 129.92.248.26

13

1580 FTP Banner Retrieval

9 11-Jun-05 16:49:46 64.233.230.53 129.92.248.26

0

1582 FTP Banner Retrieval

81.137.93.81 129.92.248.26

0

1582 FTP Banner Retrieval

11 19-Jun-05 15:43:09 84.160.148.118 129.92.248.26

2

1658 FTP Banner Retrieval

12 6-Jul-05

19:36:23 192.203.1.218 129.92.248.26

0

2327 FTP Banner Retrieval

13 7-Jul-05

00:17:55 192.203.1.218 129.92.248.26

0

1780 FTP Banner Retrieval

14 8-Jul-05

22:42:09

129.92.248.26

0

1582 FTP Banner Retrieval

15 10-Jul-05

14:45:58

68.143.90.52 129.92.248.26

0

1582 FTP Banner Retrieval

16 10-Jul-05

22:47:26

69.25.82.229 129.92.248.26

0

1582 FTP Banner Retrieval

17 16-Jul-05 15:31:58 209.123.110.70 129.92.248.26

0

1582 FTP Banner Retrieval

10 17-Jun-05 17:12:37

4.43.98.63

Port Scans
Start

#

Start

Time

Source

Day

(GMT)

IP

1 23-Jun-05

Destination Bytes Bytes Description of
IP

Sent

Rxd Exploit

0:04:42 67.115.193.178 129.92.248.27

0

0

Port Scan

2 23-Jun-05 18:00:33 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.26

0

0

Port Scan

3 30-Jun-05 14:05:22 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.26

0

4 13-Jul-05

14:31:51 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27

0

5 13-Jul-05

18:48:38 129.92.248.71 129.92.248.27

0

105 Port Scan (Windows)

……… ………….. …………. ………………. ………………

..

….

0

0

8339 10-Jul-05

23:49:48 209.26.128.174 129.92.248.26

67

845 Port Scan (ACLs)
0

Port Scan

…………………………
Port Scan
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